Why DRM Won't Work
This talk was originally given
to Microsoft's Research Group
and other interested parties
from within the company at
their
Redmond offices on June 17,
2004. Author: Cory Doctorow,
cory@eff.org
June 17, 2004 --
Greetings fellow pirates!
Arrrrr!
I'm here today to talk to
you about copyright, technology
and
DRM, I work for the Electronic
Frontier Foundation on copyright
stuff (mostly), and I live
in London. I'm not a lawyer
-- I'm a
kind of mouthpiece/activist
type, though occasionally they
shave
me and stuff me into my Bar
Mitzvah suit and send me to
a
standards body or the UN to
stir up trouble. I spend about
three
weeks a month on the road doing
completely weird stuff like
going
to Microsoft to talk about
DRM.
I lead a double life: I'm
also a science fiction writer.
That
means I've got a dog in this
fight, because I've been dreaming
of
making my living from writing
since I was 12 years old.
Admittedly, my IP-based biz
isn't as big as yours, but
I
guarantee you that it's every
bit as important to me as yours
is
to you.
Here's what I'm here to convince
you of:
1. That DRM systems don't
work
2. That DRM systems are bad
for society
3. That DRM systems are bad
for business
4. That DRM systems are bad
for artists
5. That DRM is a bad business-move
for MSFT
It's a big brief, this talk.
Microsoft has sunk a lot of
capital
into DRM systems, and spent
a lot of time sending folks
like
Martha and Brian and Peter
around to various smoke-filled
rooms
to make sure that Microsoft
DRM finds a hospitable home
in the
future world. Companies like
Microsoft steer like old Buicks,
and
this issue has a lot of forward
momentum that will be hard
to
soak up without driving the
engine block back into the
driver's
compartment. At best I think
that Microsoft might convert
some of
that momentum on DRM into angular
momentum, and in so doing,
save
all our asses.
Let's dive into it.
--
1. DRM systems don't work
This bit breaks down into
two parts:
1. A quick refresher course
in crypto theory
2. Applying that to DRM
Cryptography -- secret writing
-- is the practice of keeping
secrets. It involves three
parties: a sender, a receiver
and an
attacker (actually, there can
be more attackers, senders
and
recipients, but let's keep
this simple). We usually call
these
people Alice, Bob and Carol.
Let's say we're in the days
of the Caesar, the Gallic
War. You need to send messages
back and forth to your generals,
and you'd prefer that the enemy
doesn't get hold of them. You
can
rely on the idea that anyone
who intercepts your message
is
probably illiterate, but that's
a tough bet to stake your empire
on. You can put your messages
into the hands of reliable
messengers who'll chew them
up and swallow them if captured
--
but that doesn't help you if
Brad Pitt and his men in skirts
skewer him with an arrow before
he knows what's hit him.
So you encipher your message
with something like ROT-13,
where
every character is rotated
halfway through the alphabet.
They
used to do this with non-worksafe
material on Usenet, back when
anyone on Usenet cared about
work-safe-ness -- A would become
N,
B is O, C is P, and so forth.
To decipher, you just add 13
more,
so N goes to A, O to B yadda
yadda.
Well, this is pretty lame:
as soon as anyone figures out
your
algorithm, your secret is g0nez0red.
So if you're Caesar, you spend
a lot of time worrying about
keeping the existence of your
messengers and their payloads
secret. Get that? You're Augustus
and you need to send a message
to Brad without Caceous (a
word I'm reliably informed
means
"
cheese-like, or pertaining
to cheese") getting his
hands on it.
You give the message to Diatomaceous,
the fleetest runner in the
empire, and you encipher it
with ROT-13 and send him out
of the
garrison in the pitchest hour
of the night, making sure no
one
knows that you've sent it out.
Caceous has spies everywhere,
in
the garrison and staked out
on the road, and if one of
them puts
an arrow through Diatomaceous,
they'll have their hands on
the
message, and then if they figure
out the cipher, you're b0rked.
So the existence of the message
is a secret. The cipher is
a
secret. The ciphertext is a
secret. That's a lot of secrets,
and
the more secrets you've got,
the less secure you are, especially
if any of those secrets are
shared. Shared secrets aren't
really
all that secret any longer.
Time passes, stuff happens,
and then Tesla invents the
radio and
Marconi takes credit for it.
This is both good news and
bad news
for crypto: on the one hand,
your messages can get to anywhere
with a receiver and an antenna,
which is great for the brave
fifth columnists working behind
the enemy lines. On the other
hand, anyone with an antenna
can listen in on the message,
which
means that it's no longer practical
to keep the existence of the
message a secret. Any time
Adolf sends a message to Berlin,
he
can assume Churchill overhears
it.
Which is OK, because now we
have computers -- big, bulky
primitive mechanical computers,
but computers still. Computers
are machines for rearranging
numbers, and so scientists
on both
sides engage in a fiendish
competition to invent the most
cleverest method they can for
rearranging numerically represented
text so that the other side
can't unscramble it. The existence
of
the message isn't a secret
anymore, but the cipher is.
But this is still too many
secrets. If Bobby intercepts
one of
Adolf's Enigma machines, he
can give Churchill all kinds
of
intelligence. I mean, this
was good news for Churchill
and us,
but bad news for Adolf. And
at the end of the day, it's
bad news
for anyone who wants to keep
a secret.
Enter keys: a cipher that
uses a key is still more secure.
Even
if the cipher is disclosed,
even if the ciphertext is
intercepted, without the key
(or a break), the message is
secret.
Post-war, this is doubly important
as we begin to realize what
I
think of as Schneier's Law: "any
person can invent a security
system so clever that she or
he can't think of how to break
it."
This means that the only experimental
methodology for discovering
if you've made mistakes in
your cipher is to tell all
the smart
people you can about it and
ask them to think of ways to
break
it. Without this critical step,
you'll eventually end up living
in a fool's paradise, where
your attacker has broken your
cipher
ages ago and is quietly decrypting
all her intercepts of your
messages, snickering at you.
Best of all, there's only
one secret: the key. And with
dual-key
crypto it becomes a lot easier
for Alice and Bob to keep their
keys secret from Carol, even
if they've never met. So long
as
Alice and Bob can keep their
keys secret, they can assume
that
Carol won't gain access to
their cleartext messages, even
though
she has access to the cipher
and the ciphertext. Conveniently
enough, the keys are the shortest
and simplest of the secrets,
too: hence even easier to keep
away from Carol. Hooray for
Bob
and Alice.
Now, let's apply this to DRM.
In DRM, the attacker is *also
the recipient*. It's not Alice
and
Bob and Carol, it's just Alice
and Bob. Alice sells Bob a
DVD.
She sells Bob a DVD player.
The DVD has a movie on it --
say,
Pirates of the Caribbean --
and it's enciphered with an
algorithm
called CSS -- Content Scrambling
System. The DVD player has
a CSS
un-scrambler.
Now, let's take stock of what's
a secret here: the cipher is
well-known. The ciphertext
is most assuredly in enemy
hands, arrr.
So what? As long as the key
is secret from the attacker,
we're
golden.
But there's the rub. Alice
wants Bob to buy Pirates of
the
Caribbean from her. Bob will
only buy Pirates of the Caribbean
if
he can descramble the CSS-encrypted
VOB -- video object -- on his
DVD player. Otherwise, the
disc is only useful to Bob
as a
drinks-coaster. So Alice has
to provide Bob -- the attacker
--
with the key, the cipher and
the ciphertext.
Hilarity ensues.
DRM systems are broken in
minutes, sometimes days. Rarely,
months. It's not because the
people who think them up are
stupid.
It's not because the people
who break them are smart. It's
not
because there's a flaw in the
algorithms. At the end of the
day,
all DRM systems share a common
vulnerability: they provide
their
attackers with ciphertext,
the cipher and the key. At
this point,
the secret isn't a secret anymore.
--
2. DRM systems are bad for
society
Raise your hand if you're
thinking something like, "But
DRM
doesn't have to be proof against
smart attackers, only average
individuals! It's like a speedbump!"
Put your hand down.
This is a fallacy for two
reasons: one technical, and
one social.
They're both bad for society,
though.
Here's the technical reason:
I don't need to be a cracker
to
break your DRM. I only need
to know how to search Google,
or
Kazaa, or any of the other
general-purpose search tools
for the
cleartext that someone smarter
than me has extracted.
Raise your hand if you're
thinking something like, "But
NGSCB can
solve this problem: we'll lock
the secrets up on the logic
board
and goop it all up with epoxy."
Put your hand down.
Raise your hand if you're
a co-author of the Darknet
paper.
Everyone in the first group,
meet the co-authors of the
Darknet
paper. This is a paper that
says, among other things, that
DRM
will fail for this very reason.
Put your hands down, guys.
Here's the social reason that
DRM fails: keeping an honest
user
honest is like keeping a tall
user tall. DRM vendors tell
us that
their technology is meant to
be proof against average users,
not
organized criminal gangs like
the Ukranian pirates who stamp
out
millions of high-quality counterfeits.
It's not meant to be proof
against sophisticated college
kids. It's not meant to be
proof
against anyone who knows how
to edit her registry, or hold
down
the shift key at the right
moment, or use a search engine.
At the
end of the day, the user DRM
is meant to defend against
is the
most unsophisticated and least
capable among us.
Here's a true story about
a user I know who was stopped
by DRM.
She's smart, college educated,
and knows nothing about
electronics. She has three
kids. She has a DVD in the
living room
and an old VHS deck in the
kids' playroom. One day, she
brought
home the Toy Story DVD for
the kids. That's a substantial
investment, and given the generally
jam-smeared character of
everything the kids get their
paws on, she decided to tape
the
DVD off to VHS and give that
to the kids -- that way she
could
make a fresh VHS copy when
the first one went south. She
cabled
her DVD into her VHS and pressed
play on the DVD and record
on
the VCR and waited.
Before I go farther, I want
us all to stop a moment and
marvel at
this. Here is someone who is
practically technophobic, but
who
was able to construct a mental
model of sufficient accuracy
that
she figured out that she could
connect her cables in the right
order and dub her digital disc
off to analog tape. I imagine
that
everyone in this room is the
front-line tech support for
someone
in her or his family: wouldn't
it be great if all our non-geek
friends and relatives were
this clever and imaginative?
I also want to point out that
this is the proverbial honest
user.
She's not making a copy for
the next door neighbors. She's
not
making a copy and selling it
on a blanket on Canal Street.
She's
not ripping it to her hard-drive,
DivX encoding it and putting
it
in her Kazaa sharepoint. She's
doing something *honest* --
moving
it from one format to another.
She's home taping.
Except she fails. There's
a DRM system called Macrovision
embedded -- by law -- in every
DVD player and VHS that messes
with the vertical blanking
interval in the signal and
causes any
tape made in this fashion to
fail. Macrovision can be defeated
for about $10 with a gadget
readily available on eBay.
But our
infringer doesn't know that.
She's "honest." Technically
unsophisticated. Not stupid,
mind you -- just naive.
The Darknet paper addresses
this possibility: it even predicts
what this person will do in
the long run: she'll find out
about
Kazaa and the next time she
wants to get a movie for the
kids,
she'll download it from the
net and burn it for them.
In order to delay that day
for as long as possible, our
lawmakers
and big rightsholder interests
have come up with a disastrous
policy called anticircumvention.
Here's how anticircumvention
works: if you put a lock --
an
access control -- around a
copyrighted work, it is illegal
to
break that lock. It's illegal
to make a tool that breaks
that
lock. It's illegal to tell
someone how to make that tool.
It's
illegal to tell someone where
she can find out how to make
that
tool.
Remember Schneier's Law? Anyone
can come up with a security
system so clever that he can't
see its flaws. The only way
to
find the flaws in security
is to disclose the system's
workings
and invite public feedback.
But now we live in a world
where any
cipher used to fence off a
copyrighted work is off-limits
to that
kind of feedback. That's something
that a Princeton engineering
prof named Ed Felten discovered
when he submitted a paper to
an
academic conference on the
failings in the Secure Digital
Music
Initiative, a watermarking
scheme proposed by the recording
industry. The RIAA responded
by threatening to sue his ass
if he
tried it. We fought them because
Ed is the kind of client that
impact litigators love: unimpeachable
and clean-cut and the RIAA
folded. Lucky Ed. Maybe the
next guy isn't so lucky.
Matter of fact, the next guy
wasn't. Dmitry Skylarov is
a Russian
programmer who gave a talk
at a hacker con in Vegas on
the
failings in Adobe's e-book
locks. The FBI threw him in
the slam
for 30 days. He copped a plea,
went home to Russia, and the
Russian equivalent of the State
Department issued a blanket
warning to its researchers
to stay away from American
conferences, since we'd apparently
turned into the kind of
country where certain equations
are illegal.
Anticircumvention is a powerful
tool for people who want to
exclude competitors. If you
claim that your car engine
firmware
is a "copyrighted work," you
can sue anyone who makes a
tool for
interfacing with it. That's
not just bad news for mechanics
--
think of the hotrodders who
want to chip their cars to
tweak the
performance settings. We have
companies like Lexmark claiming
that their printer cartridges
contain copyrighted works --
software that trips an "I
am empty" flag when the
toner runs out,
and have sued a competitor
who made a remanufactured cartridge
that reset the flag. Even garage-door
opener companies have
gotten in on the act, claiming
that their receivers' firmware
are
copyrighted works. Copyrighted
cars, print carts and garage-door
openers: what's next, copyrighted
light-fixtures?
Even in the context of legitimate
-- excuse me, "traditional" --
copyrighted works like movies
on DVDs, anticircumvention
is bad
news. Copyright is a delicate
balance. It gives creators
and
their assignees some rights,
but it also reserves some rights
to
the public. For example, an
author has no right to prohibit
anyone from transcoding his
books into assistive formats
for the
blind. More importantly, though,
a creator has a very limited
say
over what you can do once you
lawfully acquire her works.
If I
buy your book, your painting,
or your DVD, it belongs to
me. It's
my property. Not my "intellectual
property" -- a whacky
kind of
pseudo-property that's swiss-cheesed
with exceptions, easements
and limitations -- but real,
no-fooling, actual tangible
*property* -- the kind of thing
that courts have been managing
through tort law for centuries.
But anticirumvention lets
rightsholders invent new and
exciting
copyrights for themselves --
to write private laws without
accountability or deliberation
-- that expropriate your interest
in your physical property to
their favor. Region-coded DVDs
are
an example of this: there's
no copyright here or in anywhere
I
know of that says that an author
should be able to control where
you enjoy her creative works,
once you've paid for them.
I can
buy a book and throw it in
my bag and take it anywhere
from
Toronto to Timbuktu, and read
it wherever I am: I can even
buy
books in America and bring
them to the UK, where the author
may
have an exclusive distribution
deal with a local publisher
who
sells them for double the US
shelf-price. When I'm done
with it,
I can sell it on or give it
away in the UK. Copyright lawyers
call this "First Sale," but
it may be simpler to think
of it as
"
Capitalism."
The keys to decrypt a DVD
are controlled by an org called
DVD-CCA, and they have a bunch
of licensing requirements for
anyone who gets a key from
them. Among these is something
called
region-coding: if you buy a
DVD in France, it'll have a
flag set
that says, "I am a French
DVD." Bring that DVD to
America and
your DVD player will compare
the flag to its list of permitted
regions, and if they don't
match, it will tell you that
it's not
allowed to play your disc.
Remember: there is no copyright
that says that an author gets
to
do this. When we wrote the
copyright statutes and granted
authors
the right to control display,
performance, duplication,
derivative works, and so forth,
we didn't leave out "geography"
by accident. That was on-purpose.
So when your French DVD won't
play in America, that's not
because
it'd be illegal to do so: it's
because the studios have invented
a business-model and then invented
a copyright law to prop it
up.
The DVD is your property and
so is the DVD player, but if
you
break the region-coding on
your disc, you're going to
run afoul
of anticircumvention.
That's what happened to Jon
Johansen, a Norweigan teenager
who
wanted to watch French DVDs
on his Norweigan DVD player.
He and
some pals wrote some code to
break the CSS so that he could
do
so. He's a wanted man here
in America; in Norway the studios
put
the local fuzz up to bringing
him up on charges of *unlawfully
trespassing upon a computer
system.* When his defense asked,
"
Which computer has Jon trespassed
upon?" the answer was: "His
own."
His no-fooling, real and physical
property has been expropriated
by the weird, notional, metaphorical
intellectual property on his
DVD: DRM only works if your
record player becomes the property
of
whomever's records you're playing.
--
3. DRM systems are bad for
biz
This is the worst of all the
ideas embodied by DRM: that
people
who make record-players should
be able to spec whose records
you
can listen to, and that people
who make records should have
a
veto over the design of record-players.
We've never had this principle:
in fact, we've always had just
the reverse. Think about all
the things that can be plugged
into
a parallel or serial interface,
which were never envisioned
by
their inventors. Our strong
economy and rapid innovation
are
byproducts of the ability of
anyone to make anything that
plugs
into anything else: from the
Flo-bee electric razor that
snaps
onto the end of your vacuum-hose
to the octopus spilling out
of
your car's dashboard lighter
socket, standard interfaces
that
anyone can build for are what
makes billionaires out of nerds.
The courts affirm this again
and again. It used to be illegal
to
plug anything that didn't come
from AT&T into your phone-jack.
They claimed that this was
for the safety of the network,
but
really it was about propping
up this little penny-ante racket
that AT&T had in charging
you a rental fee for your phone
until
you'd paid for it a thousand
times over.
When that ban was struck down,
it created the market for
third-party phone equipment,
from talking novelty phones
to
answering machines to cordless
handsets to headsets -- billions
of dollars of economic activity
that had been supressed by
the
closed interface. Note that
AT&T was one of the big
beneficiaries
of this: they *also* got into
the business of making phone-kit.
DRM is the software equivalent
of these closed hardware
interfaces. Robert Scoble is
a Softie who has an excellent
blog,
where he wrote an essay about
the best way to protect your
investment in the digital music
you buy. Should you buy Apple
iTunes music, or Microsoft
DRM music? Scoble argued that
Microsoft's music was a sounder
investment, because Microsoft
would have more downstream
licensees for its proprietary
format
and therefore you'd have a
richer ecosystem of devices
to choose
from when you were shopping
for gizmos to play your virtual
records on.
What a weird idea: that we
should evaluate our record-purchases
on the basis of which recording
company will allow the greatest
diversity of record-players
to play its discs! That's like
telling someone to buy the
Betamax instead of the Edison
Kinetoscope because Thomas
Edison is a crank about licensing
his
patents; all the while ignoring
the world's relentless march
to
the more open VHS format.
It's a bad business. DVD is
a format where the guy who
makes the
records gets to design the
record players. Ask yourself:
how much
innovation has there been over
the past decade of DVD players?
They've gotten cheaper and
smaller, but where are the
weird and
amazing new markets for DVD
that were opened up by the
VCR?
There's a company that's manufacturing
the world's first
HDD-based DVD jukebox, a thing
that holds 30 movies, and they're
charging *$30,000* for this
thing. We're talking about
a $300
hard drive and a $300 PC --
all that other cost is the
cost of
anticompetition.
--
4. DRM systems are bad for
artists
But what of the artist? The
hardworking filmmaker, the
ink-stained scribbler, the
heroin-cured leathery rock-star?
We
poor slobs of the creative
class are everyone's favorite
poster-children here: the RIAA
and MPAA hold us up and say,
"
Won't someone please think
of the children?" File-sharers
say,
"
Yeah, we're thinking about
the artists, but the labels
are The
Man, who cares what happens
to you?"
To understand what DRM does
to artists, you need to understand
how copyright and technology
interact. Copyright is inherently
technological, since the things
it addresses -- copying,
transmitting, and so on --
are inherently technological.
The piano roll was the first
system for cheaply copying
music. It
was invented at a time when
the dominant form of entertainment
in
America was getting a talented
pianist to come into your living
room and pound out some tunes
while you sang along. The music
industry consisted mostly of
sheet-music publishers.
The player piano was a digital
recording and playback system.
Piano-roll companies bought
sheet music and ripped the
notes
printed on it into 0s and 1s
on a long roll of computer
tape,
which they sold by the thousands
-- the hundreds of thousands
--
the millions. They did this
without a penny's compensation
to the
publishers. They were digital
music pirates. Arrrr!
Predictably, the composers
and music publishers went nutso.
Sousa
showed up in Congress to say
that:
These talking machines are going to ruin the
artistic development of music in this
country. When I was a boy...in front of every
house in the summer evenings, you would find
young people together singing the songs of
the day or old songs. Today you hear these
infernal machines going night and day. We
will not have a vocal chord left. The vocal
chord will be eliminated by a process of
evolution, as was the tail of man when he
came from the ape.
The publishers asked Congress
to ban the piano roll and to
create
a law that said that any new
system for reproducing music
should
be subject to a veto from their
industry association. Lucky
for
us, Congress realized what
side of their bread had butter
on it
and decided not to criminalize
the dominant form of entertainment
in America.
But there was the problem
of paying artists. The Constitution
sets out the purpose of American
copyright: to promote the useful
arts and sciences. The composers
had a credible story that they'd
do less composing if they weren't
paid for it, so Congress needed
a fix. Here's what they came
up with: anyone who paid a
music
publisher two cents would have
the right to make one piano
roll
of any song that publisher
published. The publisher couldn't
say
no, and no one had to hire
a lawyer at $200 an hour to
argue
about whether the payment should
be two cents or a nickel.
This compulsory license is
still in place today: when
Joe Cocker
sings "With a Little Help
from My Friends," he pays
a fixed fee
to the Beatles' publisher and
away he goes -- even if Ringo
hates
the idea. If you ever wondered
how Sid Vicious talked Anka
into
letting him get a crack at "My
Way," well, now you know.
That compulsory license created
a world where a thousand times
more money was made by a thousand
times more creators who made
a
thousand times more music that
reached a thousand times more
people.
This story repeats itself
throughout the technological
century,
every ten or fifteen years.
Radio was enabled by a voluntary
blanket license -- the music
companies got together and
asked for
an antitrust exemption so that
they could offer all their
music
for a flat fee. Cable TV took
a compulsory: the only way
cable
operators could get their hands
on broadcasts was to pirate
them
and shove them down the wire,
and Congress saw fit to legalize
this practice rather than screw
around with their constituents'
TVs.
Sometimes, the courts and
Congress decided to simply
take away a
copyright -- that's what happened
with the VCR. When Sony brought
out the VCR in 1976, the studios
had already decided what the
experience of watching a movie
in your living room would look
like: they'd licensed out their
programming for use on a machine
called a Discovision, which
played big LP-sized discs that
disintegrated after a few plays.
Proto-DRM.
The copyright scholars of
the day didn't give the VCR
very good
odds. Sony argued that their
box allowed for a fair use,
which is
defined as a use that a court
rules is a defense against
infringement based on four
factors: whether the use transforms
the work into something new,
like a collage; whether it
uses all
or some of the work; whether
the work is artistic or mainly
factual; and whether the use
undercuts the creator's
business-model.
The Betamax failed on all
four fronts: when you time-shifted
or
duplicated a Hollywood movie
off the air, you made a
non-transformative use of 100
percent of a creative work
in a way
that directly undercut the
Discovision licensing stream.
Jack Valenti, the mouthpiece
for the motion-picture industry,
told Congress in 1982 that
the VCR was to the American
film
industry "as the Boston
Strangler is to a woman home
alone."
But the Supreme Court ruled
against Hollywood in 1984,
when it
determined that any device
capable of a substantial
non-infringing use was legal.
In other words, "We don't
buy this
Boston Strangler business:
if your business model can't
survive
the emergence of this general-purpose
tool, it's time to get
another business-model or go
broke."
Hollywood found another business
model, as the broadcasters
had,
as the Vaudeville artists had,
as the music publishers had,
and
they made more art that paid
more artists and reached a
wider
audience.
There's one thing that every
new art business-model had
in
common: it embraced the medium
it lived in.
This is the overweening characteristic
of every single successful
new medium: it is true to itself.
The Luther Bible didn't
succeed on the axes that made
a hand-copied monk Bible valuable:
they were ugly, they weren't
in Church Latin, they weren't
read
aloud by someone who could
interpret it for his lay audience,
they didn't represent years
of devoted-with-a-capital-D
labor by
someone who had given his life
over to God. The thing that
made
the Luther Bible a success
was its scalability: it was
more
popular because it was more
proliferate: all success factors
for
a new medium pale beside its
profligacy. The most successful
organisms on earth are those
that reproduce the most: bugs
and
bacteria, nematodes and virii.
Reproduction is the best of
all
survival strategies.
Piano rolls didn't sound as
good as the music of a skilled
pianist: but they *scaled better*.
Radio lacked the social
elements of live performance,
but more people could build
a
crystal set and get it aimed
correctly than could pack into
even
the largest Vaudeville house.
MP3s don't come with liner
notes,
they aren't sold to you by
a hipper-than-thou record store
clerk
who can help you make your
choice, bad rips and truncated
files
abound: I once downloaded a
twelve-second copy of "Hey
Jude" from
the original Napster. Yet MP3
is outcompeting the CD. I don't
know what to do with CDs anymore:
I get them, and they're like
the especially garment bag
they give you at the fancy
suit shop:
it's nice and you feel like
a goof for throwing it out,
but
Christ, how many of these things
can you usefully own? I can
put
ten thousand songs on my laptop,
but a comparable pile of discs,
with liner notes and so forth
-- that's a liability: it's
a piece
of my monthly storage-locker
costs.
Here are the two most important
things to know about computers
and the Internet:
1. A computer is a machine
for rearranging bits
2. The Internet is a machine
for moving bits from one place
to
another very cheaply and quickly
Any new medium that takes
hold on the Internet and with
computers
will embrace these two facts,
not regret them. A newspaper
press
is a machine for spitting out
cheap and smeary newsprint
at
speed: if you try to make it
output fine art lithos, you'll
get
junk. If you try to make it
output newspapers, you'll get
the
basis for a free society.
And so it is with the Internet.
At the heyday of Napster, record
execs used to show up at conferences
and tell everyone that
Napster was doomed because
no one wanted lossily compressed
MP3s
with no liner notes and truncated
files and misspelled metadata.
Today we hear ebook publishers
tell each other and anyone
who'll
listen that the barrier to
ebooks is screen resolution.
It's
bollocks, and so is the whole
sermonette about how nice a
book
looks on your bookcase and
how nice it smells and how
easy it is
to slip into the tub. These
are obvious and untrue things,
like
the idea that radio will catch
on once they figure out how
to
sell you hotdogs during the
intermission, or that movies
will
really hit their stride when
we can figure out how to bring
the
actors out for an encore when
the film's run out. Or that
what
the Protestant Reformation
really needs is Luther Bibles
with
facsimile illumination in the
margin and a rent-a-priest
to read
aloud from your personal Word
of God.
New media don't succeed because
they're like the old media,
only
better: they succeed because
they're worse than the old
media at
the stuff the old media is
good at, and better at the
stuff the
old media are bad at. Books
are good at being paperwhite,
high-resolution, low-infrastructure,
cheap and disposable. Ebooks
are good at being everywhere
in the world at the same time
for
free in a form that is so malleable
that you can just pastebomb
it into your IM session or
turn it into a page-a-day mailing
list.
The only really successful
epublishing -- I mean, hundreds
of
thousands, millions of copies
distributed and read -- is
the
bookwarez scene, where scanned-and-OCR'd
books are distributed on
the darknet. The only legit
publishers with any success
at
epublishing are the ones whose
books cross the Internet without
technological fetter: publishers
like Baen Books and my own,
Tor,
who are making some or all
of their catalogs available
in ASCII
and HTML and PDF.
The hardware-dependent ebooks,
the DRM use-and-copy-restricted
ebooks, they're cratering.
Sales measured in the tens,
sometimes
the hundreds. Science fiction
is a niche business, but when
you're selling copies by the
ten, that's not even a business,
it's a hobby.
Every one of you has been
riding a curve where you read
more and
more words off of more and
more screens every day through
most of
your professional careers.
It's zero-sum: you've also
been
reading fewer words off of
fewer pages as time went by:
the
dinosauric executive who prints
his email and dictates a reply
to
his secretary is info-roadkill.
Today, at this very second,
people read words off of screens
for
every hour that they can find.
Your kids stare at their Game
Boys
until their eyes fall out.
Euroteens ring doorbells with
their
hypertrophied, SMS-twitching
thumbs instead of their index
fingers.
Paper books are the packaging
that books come in. Cheap
printer-binderies like the
Internet Bookmobile that can
produce a
full bleed, four color, glossy
cover, printed spine,
perfect-bound book in ten minutes
for a dollar are the future
of
paper books: when you need
an instance of a paper book,
you
generate one, or part of one,
and pitch it out when you're
done.
I landed at SEA-TAC on Monday
and burned a couple CDs from
my
music collection to listen
to in the rental car. When
I drop the
car off, I'll leave them behind.
Who needs 'em?
Whenever a new technology
has disrupted copyright, we've
changed
copyright. Copyright isn't
an ethical proposition, it's
a
utilitarian one. There's nothing
*moral* about paying a composer
tuppence for the piano-roll
rights, there's nothing *immoral*
about not paying Hollywood
for the right to videotape
a movie off
your TV. They're just the best
way of balancing out so that
people's physical property
rights in their VCRs and phonographs
are respected and so that creators
get enough of a dangling
carrot to go on making shows
and music and books and paintings.
Technology that disrupts copyright
does so because it simplifies
and cheapens creation, reproduction
and distribution. The
existing copyright businesses
exploit inefficiencies in the
old
production, reproduction and
distribution system, and they'll
be
weakened by the new technology.
But new technology always gives
us more art with a wider reach:
that's what tech is *for*.
Tech gives us bigger pies
that more artists can get a
bite out
of. That's been tacitly acknowledged
at every stage of the
copyfight since the piano roll.
When copyright and technology
collide, it's copyright that
changes.
Which means that today's copyright
-- the thing that DRM
nominally props up -- didn't
come down off the mountain
on two
stone tablets. It was created
in living memory to accommodate
the
technical reality created by
the inventors of the previous
generation. To abandon invention
now robs tomorrow's artists
of
the new businesses and new
reach and new audiences that
the
Internet and the PC can give
them.
--
5. DRM is a bad business-move
for MSFT
When Sony brought out the
VCR, it made a record player
that could
play Hollywood's records, even
if Hollywood didn't like the
idea.
The industries that grew up
on the back of the VCR -- movie
rentals, home taping, camcorders,
even Bar Mitzvah videographers
-- made billions for Sony and
its cohort.
That was good business --
even if Sony lost the Betamax-VHS
format wars, the money on the
world-with-VCRs table was enough
to
make up for it.
But then Sony acquired a relatively
tiny entertainment company
and it started to massively
screw up. When MP3 rolled around
and
Sony's walkman customers were
clamoring for a solid-state
MP3
player, Sony let its music
business-unit run its show:
instead of
making a high-capacity MP3
walkman, Sony shipped its Music
Clips,
low-capacity devices that played
brain-damaged DRM formats like
Real and OpenMG. They spent
good money engineering "features"
into these devices that kept
their customers from freely
moving
their music back and forth
between their devices. Customers
stayed away in droves.
Today, Sony is dead in the
water when it comes to walkmen.
The
market leaders are poky Singaporean
outfits like Creative Labs
--
the kind of company that Sony
used to crush like a bug, back
before it got borged by its
entertainment unit -- and PC
companies like Apple.
That's because Sony shipped
a product that there was no
market
demand for. No Sony customer
woke up one morning and said, "Damn,
I wish Sony would devote some
expensive engineering effort
in
order that I may do less with
my music." Presented with
an
alternative, Sony's customers
enthusiastically jumped ship.
The same thing happened to
a lot of people I know who
used to rip
their CDs to WMA. You guys
sold them software that produced
smaller, better-sounding rips
that the MP3 rippers, but you
also
fixed it so that the songs
you ripped were device-locked
to their
PCs. What that meant is that
when they backed up their music
to
another hard-drive and reinstalled
their OS (something that the
spyware and malware wars has
made more common than ever),
they
discovered that after they
restored their music that they
could
no longer play it. The player
saw the new OS as a different
machine, and locked them out
of their own music.
There is no market demand
for this "feature." None
of your
customers want you to make
expensive modifications to
your
products that make backing
up and restoring even harder.
And
there is no moment when your
customers will be less forgiving
than the moment that they are
recovering from catastrophic
technology failures.
I speak from experience. Because
I buy a new Powerbook every
ten
months, and because I always
order the new models the day
they're
announced, I get a lot of lemons
from Apple. That means that
I
hit Apple's three-iTunes-authorized-computers
limit pretty early
on and found myself unable
to play the hundreds of dollars'
worth
of iTunes songs I'd bought
because one of my authorized
machines
was a lemon that Apple had
broken up for parts, one was
in the
shop getting fixed by Apple,
and one was my mom's computer,
3,000
miles away in Toronto.
If I had been a less good
customer for Apple's hardware,
I would
have been fine. If I had been
a less enthusiastic evangelist
for
Apple's products -- if I hadn't
shown my mom how iTunes Music
Store worked -- I would have
been fine. If I hadn't bought
so
much iTunes music that burning
it to CD and re-ripping it
and
re-keying all my metadata was
too daunting a task to consider,
I
would have been fine.
As it was Apple rewarded my
trust, evangelism and out-of-control
spending by treating me like
a crook and locking me out
of my own
music, at a time when my Powerbook
was in the shop -- i.e., at
a
time when I was hardly disposed
to feel charitable to Apple.
I'm an edge case here, but
I'm a *leading edge* case.
If Apple
succeeds in its business plans,
it will only be a matter of
time
until even average customers
have upgraded enough hardware
and
bought enough music to end
up where I am.
You know what I would totally
buy? A record player that let
me
play everybody's records. Right
now, the closest I can come
to
that is an open source app
called VLC, but it's clunky
and buggy
and it didn't come pre-installed
on my computer.
Sony didn't make a Betamax
that only played the movies
that
Hollywood was willing to permit
-- Hollywood asked them to
do it,
they proposed an early, analog
broadcast flag that VCRs could
hunt for and respond to by
disabling recording. Sony ignored
them
and made the product they thought
their customers wanted.
I'm a Microsoft customer.
Like millions of other Microsoft
customers, I want a player
that plays anything I throw
at it, and
I think that you are just the
company to give it to me.
Yes, this would violate copyright
law as it stands, but Microsoft
has been making tools of piracy
that change copyright law for
decades now. Outlook, Exchange
and MSN are tools that abet
widescale digital infringement.
More significantly, IIS and
your caching proxies all make
and
serve copies of documents without
their authors' consent,
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